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Abstract 
Analyzing 30 OECD-countries in 1980-2005, this paper documents the effect of an aging 
electorate on pension expenditure. The first outcome is that an increase in the age of the 
median voter leads to less generous pension benefits. The second outcome is that an older 
median voter is not significantly associated with an increase in pension expenditure relative to 
GDP.  These results do not change when health care costs are considered instead of pension 
expenditure. The results contradict the main prediction of median voter models that an older 
median voter will successfully push for higher individual benefits. An alternative specification 
with the dependency ratio as the operationalization of aging, does show a positive and 
significant effect of aging on pension expenditure. A positive effect of aging on the generosity of 
pensions can however also not be found in this case.  
 
JEL classification: C23; H55; J18 







Aging has called the financial sustainability of publicly financed pension arrangements  
into question (Castles (2004)). This has become more pressing with the credit crisis, in 
which the health of public finance deteriorated. There are two analytically distinct ways 
in which aging may positively influence pension expenditure. 
 The first effect is that there are more retirees on the receiving end of Social 
Security. As a result, aging naturally leads to higher total pension expenditure. This 
upward effect on pension expenditure can only be counterbalanced by a considerable 
decrease of benefits per retiree. A second effect of aging is that there are more older 
voters; retirees thus have more political influence. Median voter models in particular 
postulate that an older median voter will successfully push for more generous pension 
benefits (Galasso (2006), Persson and Tabellini (2000)). Aging will then not only lead to 
higher total spending but also to higher expenditure relative to the number of retirees.  
Using OECD data from 30 countries between 1980 and 2005, this paper tests the 
median voter hypothesis that an older median voter leads to more generous pension 
benefits. The effect of an older median voter on pension expenditure relative to GDP is 
considered as well. Additionally also the association between aging and health care 
costs is considered. Aging is frequently assumed to be positively associated with health 
care costs, as elderly need health care relatively more than younger people do.  
Only public spending is taken into account here, disregarding savings via pension 
funds, insurance companies and banks. We focus on the political pressure to increase 
pensions theorized to arise from an older electorate. As governments can influence 
public spending directly, public pension spending should be first and foremost affected 
if such political pressure indeed exists.  
All estimates result from a fixed effect model controlling for several economic 
and political covariates, including unemployment, GDP per capita, union density, the 
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interest rate and type of government. We do not find empirical support for the median 
voter hypothesis. In fact we find the opposite: aging influences the generosity of 
individual benefits negatively and significantly in the baseline regression. In some 
alternative specifications the effect is insignificant and still negative. An older median 
voter is also not associated with higher health care costs. 
We do find some though not conclusive empirical support for the proposition 
that aging leads to more public spending as a share of GDP. In the baseline regression an 
increase of the median age does not lead to an increase in public spending as a share of 
GDP. In several alternative specifications there is however a positive and significant 
association. Aging has a positive effect when time effects are discarded or when aging is 
operationalized with the dependency ratio instead of the age of the median voter. 
Several earlier papers have investigated the relationship between aging and 
retirement spending. Breyer and Craig (1997) use OECD-data for 20 countries in 1960-
1990 with 10-year intervals and find that benefits as a fraction of GDP are positively and 
significantly related to the median voter age. Depending on the specification, an 
increase of one year of the latter increases spending relative to GDP by 0.4-0.6 
percentage points. The median age is positively but not significantly related to benefits 
per pensioner. Tepe and Vanhuysse (2010) reach the same conclusions based on 18 
countries between 1980 and 2000 using eight-year intervals. They operationalize aging 
with the dependency ratio instead of the age of the median voter. Here both are 
considered. A controversial claim is made by Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) stating that 
a higher dependency ratio is associated with lower pension contributions. This has been 
challenged by Disney (2007) and Sanz and Velazquez (2007) who criticize both the 
(static) model specification and the operationalization of aging and social security 
(which also includes unemployment benefits).  
Shelton (2008) re-estimates the model of Razin et al.. The most important 
difference is that he uses the number of people over 64 divided by the number of 
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people between 15-64 as the dependency ratio. Depending on the specification a higher 
dependency ratio has a positive and significant effect on per capita transfers while the 
dependency ratio is insignificant in a more elaborate model. The difference between 
Shelton and this study is first that the latter considers benefits per retiree as the 
dependent variable (instead of transfers per capita). The second difference is that 
Shelton does not include time effects, political control variables (union density and 
government features) or the interest rate while the model here does not include 
openness of the economy (a variable that Shelton includes). 
Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2002) have a somewhat different approach. They 
show that democracies do not spend more on social security than undemocratic 
countries. They conclude that for social security “much more important are economic 
and demographic variables, such as the aging of the population and economic growth.”  
Our contribution to this literature is twofold. First, we incorporate more recent 
data and consider relevant regressors not used earlier. We also use more observations 
than is common in the literature. This paper has a minimum of 109 observations 
whereas Breyer and Craig and Tepe and Vanhuysse have a maximum of 76 and 54 
observations respectively. This elaborated, respecified and updated approach generally 
confirms earlier findings, thereby strengthening these previous conclusions. This is all 
the more relevant because aging is a relatively recent phenomenon that by its nature 
increases gradually over time. Our data thus include observations with a median age 
higher than found in earlier studies.  
The second and novel contribution is that we also evaluate health care costs. 
Health care costs are not incorporated in the aforementioned literature but are often 
argued to be related to aging as well. Older voters may be interested in higher health 
care spending, in much the same way as they are in higher pension benefits. A full 
analysis considers both factors, or as Tepe and Vanhuysse state: “Recent studies 
indicate that elderly voters actually care less about the real value of their pensions than 
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about health issues. Future research could therefore usefully analyze the effects of 
population aging on health care spending.” We do exactly that. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
theoretical literature on Social Security and in particular the predicted effect of a greying 
median voter on benefits. The third section discusses the data and the model. The 
fourth section shows the results whereas the fifth section considers several extensions 
and robustness analyses. The sixth section concludes. 
 
II. Theoretical background and related literature 
 
There is a well-developed and substantial theoretical literature on the political economy 
of social security, see Galasso (2002) and Breyer (1994) for still up-to-date overviews. An 
important and dominant approach is the median voter model (Browning (1975), Persson 
and Tabellini (2000), Galasso (2006), Conesa and Krueger (1999) and Cooley and Soares 
(1999)).  
 In median voter models aging generally has two opposing effects on the 
preferences of the decisive median voter. A first, economic effect is that the rate of 
return of a Pay-as-you-go system decreases, as the ratio between workers and retirees 
decreases. This will make a PAYG-system less attractive for all voters, including the 
median voter. A second, political effect is that the median voter will be older. He or she 
will thus be more and more inclined to support more generous pension benefits. If 
elections take place once and the outcome thereof remains in effect forever after, this 
political effect outweighs the economic effect and an older median voter will 
successfully push for higher benefits (Browning (1975) and Persson and Tabellini 
(2000)). The crucial implication of median voter models is thus that benefits will become 
more generous as the median voter ages, or as Persson and Tabellini state: “A social 
planner, for example, would also spend more on pensions with a larger number of 
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elderly people. The model really predicts that pensions per retiree will be higher, the 
higher the weight on old voters (..), as this shifts the median-voter equilibrium toward a 
more generous pension system.” 
This result hinges on the assumption that elections take place once and the 
resulting outcome is binding forever after. This assumption is however counter-factual 
as policies change over time. Alternatively, Sjoblom (1985), Conesa and Krueger (1999) 
and Cooley and Soares (1999) understand PAYG arrangements as an intergenerational 
game where elections take place each period. In this case multiple equilibria arise. If 
voters do not expect that their contributions will influence future contributions made to 
them, they will not contribute. A self-rationalizing equilibrium with zero contributions 
may then result; if no future generation contributes, it is best to do likewise. Positive 
transfers can still be supported by the threat that future generations will withhold 
future contributions if current working generations do not contribute to current 
retirees. Each generation then contributes in favor of retirees, because this results in 
future generations contributing likewise. In the resulting equilibrium, each generation 
takes into account the behavior of previous generations in a reaction function. This 
reaction function gives the current contribution as a function of contributions of 
previous generations and it can be interpreted as a social contract between generations 
(Sjoblom (1985), Boldrin and Rustichini (2000)). Any transfer scheme that outperforms 
the default option of zero contributions and zero benefits can subsequently result as a 
subgame perfect equilibrium.  
When elections take place each period, the effect of aging on pension 
expenditure is not clear a priori as multiple equilibria are possible.  However, if an effect 
is predicted, the aforementioned median voter reasoning is applied with an older 
median voter leading to increased pension contributions and benefits. Galasso (2006) 
for example predicts a dramatic increase in pension spending: Spain will increase its 
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spending on social security from 21.3% of wages to 45.5% in 2050 and the UK from 
14.5% to 33.2%.   
Aging may also simultaneously increase contributions and decrease benefits. 
That is, the ‘burden of aging’ is shared between working and retired generations. This is 
the main outcome of Breyer and Stolte (2001). In their OLG-model, the retired 
generation forms a majority, holding all political power. This does not lead to 
contributions of 100% because young generations respond to higher taxation by 
decreasing their labor supply. The older generations effectively maximize a Laffer curve 
that gives total tax revenues as a function of the tax rate. Breyer and Stolte predict that 
aging leads to both higher contributions and lower individual benefits. The combination 
of higher contributions and lower benefits is also the outcome of probability voting 
models. In these models the incumbent party maximizes political support by maximizing 
the sum of utility of different cohorts, weighing utility proportional to cohort-size, see 
Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt (2007). Probability voting models thereby take the position 
that larger cohorts have more influence but that minorities are not politically powerless. 
It also allows for the possibility that pension policy is not the only factor that voters 
consider in their voting decision. 
Yet another view is given by Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), who propose that 
aging leads to the break-down of social security altogether. Aging makes PAYG less and 
less attractive and at one point working generations will stop contributing to social 
security. Key in their two-period OLG-model is that this moment of break-down is 
uncertain because future demographic developments are uncertain. Each generation 
has the choice to continue social security, facing ex-ante a positive probability but not 
the certainty that the next generation will do the same. The last contributing generation 
will lose ex post, because older generations are not compensated. In this approach aging 
leads to a definite breakdown of social security at an indefinite moment. As no social 
8 
 
security system has been totally dismantled in an OECD-country, this prediction cannot 
be confirmed (though it can also not be ruled out that this scenario awaits). 
 
III. Data and econometric model 
 
All data are retrieved from publicly available sources of the OECD, the World Bank and 
the Comparative Political Data Set.1 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 1. 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Retirement spending / GDP  6.23 2.74 0.1 12.60 
Benefit / retiree 10020.84 4808.92 312.20 26221.99 
Health / GDP 5.57 1.07 3.13 8.24 
Health / inhabitant 1350.38 536.06 308.57 4186.19 
Median age 34.20 4.89 17.43 43.10 
Dependency 21.81 5.38 7.58 32.55 
Unemployment  6.72 3.78 0.18 18.76 
GDP per capita 21310.02 8401.05 4865.44 59888.22 
Union density 39.99 20.62 8.01 86.62 
Interest rate 8.72 4.45 1.35 29.03 
Government ideology 2.48 1.55 1 5 
Minority government 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Single party government 0.29 0.46 0 1 
 
 
The median age of the electorate is proxied by the median age of the whole population, 
as reported by the World Bank. This data limitation is recognized, however both median 
ages are driven by the same two factors, namely fertility rates and mortality rates.  
In total four different dependent variables are considered. The first measure of 
pension expenditure is total expenditure relative to GDP. This ranges between 0.1% and 
12.1%. The following graph gives the average expenditure relative to GDP for the 21 
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countries for which this figure is available in each year.2 The graph also gives health care 
spending as a share of GDP for the same countries. 
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Retirement benefits (%GDP) Health care (%GDP)
 
 
A second measure is benefits per retiree. This figure is derived by dividing total 
expenditure by the number of people older than 64. This is an approximation as it does 
not take account of differences in the retirement-age. The exact number of retirees in 
countries is however unavailable. The number of people over 64 is the best 
approximation available but it is a data limitation all the same. This indicator is also used 
in other studies on the effects of aging. The next graph provides the development of 
                                                 
2
 The entire sample of 30 countries consists of Australia*, Austria*, Belgium*, Canada*, Czech Republic, 
Denmark*, Finland*, France*, Germany*, Greece*, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland*, Italy*, Japan*, Korea, 
Luxembourg*, Mexico, Netherlands*, New Zealand*, Norway*, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain*, 
Sweden*, Switzerland*, Turkey, United Kingdom*, United States*. For the 21 countries denoted * data 
are available for the entire period.  
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individual benefits for the same 21 countries for which these numbers are available 
each year; 1980 is the baseline year, indexed 100. It also gives the development of 
health care costs per inhabitant. 
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Retirement benefits Health care 
 
 
The third variable is health care costs relative to GDP, while the fourth 
dependent variable is health care costs per inhabitant. Health care costs per retiree are 
not separately available and can thus not be considered. Meara et al. (2004) find for the 
USA that per person spending developed differently over time. In 1963-1987 spending 
per person increased relatively faster for persons over 64 years; in 1987-2000 the costs 
for this age group relatively declined compared with the age group of 35-44 years. For 
other countries cohort-specific health care spending is not available. The resulting 
limitation of using health care costs per inhabitant is acknowledged. However this need 
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not be problematic as health care spending is difficult to target at a specific group. If 
retirees successfully plead for higher health care spending, this will thus lead to more 
health care available for all voters alike. Whether other age groups make use of 
increased health care possibilities is another issue. 
The regressors can be grouped in economic and political control variables. 
Unemployment and the interest rate are economic control variables indicating the 
economic and financial circumstances of a country respectively. High unemployment 
arguably decreases the scope for social security while a high interest rate hinders debt-
financing of retirement expenditure. The effect of GDP per capita is less straightforward. 
If pensions are indexed to GDP, GDP does not affect pension expenditure relative to 
GDP. If this is not the case and benefits increase less than GDP, higher GDP is associated 
with lower pension expenditure as a share of GDP. There may also be a political effect, 
when higher GDP makes it politically easier to redistribute; this would lead to a positive 
effect of GDP on pension benefits. 
Political factors other than the age of the median voter are potentially 
important. The first factor considered is union density, ranging from 8% to 86%. A strong 
union may successfully press for higher benefits for their (former) members. A 
government of left-wing signature may likewise lead to higher benefits. The ideological 
signature of the government is indicated by the proportion of the government that is 
made up of left-wing parties. There were 59 governments that were exclusively made 
up of right-wing parties whereas 26 governments consisted solely of left-wing parties. 
We further include dummy variables for two features of the government. A first dummy 
indicates whether the government consists of a single party. Such a government may be 
either more effective in pushing through its own agenda or may shy away from 
unpopular policy changes as blame cannot be shared with other parties. A second 
dummy indicates whether the government is a minority government or not. A 
government without a majority in parliament may be less effective in pushing through 
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its own preferred policy. Finally, time effects are considered by a dummy for each time 
period, with the first time period (the year 1980) as the reference category. 
The period 1980-2005 is chosen solely for practical considerations of data 
availability. Five-year intervals are considered instead of one year intervals,  the reason 
being that pension reforms need time to be developed, discussed and implemented and 
reforms are thus not implemented yearly. A five-year period is chosen because that 
covers a political cycle in which one (or more) reform(s) can take place. There is also a 
practical reason to dismiss one year intervals. The median age hardly changes one year 
to the next and estimation results would therefore not be robust. 
The econometric model used is a panel data model with fixed effects, and the 
coefficients are estimated with the within-estimator. Pooled regression leads to an 
inconsistent estimator whenever time-invariant country-specific effects (like habit 
formation, geography, culture, path-dependent policies) correlate with covariates. 
Exactly the same holds for the random effects model. For non-experimental data fixed 
effects are thus more reasonable that the random effects. If the crucial assumption that 
fixed effects are uncorrelated with all regressors does hold, the fixed-effect estimator 
used here is still unbiased and consistent, but less efficient than the random effects 
estimator.  
The base-line regression model is then given by the following equation: 
 
yi,t=αi+β1Medianagei,t+ β2Unemploymenti,t+ β3Interest ratei,t+ 






jtj I +εi,t i=1,2,..,30, t=1980, 1985,..,2005 
 
Here yi,t is one of the four dependent variables that were discussed. The period-
dummies for 1985 until 2005 are given by indicator functions; the year 1980 is the 
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reference category. For health care costs time effects can be interpreted as 
technological change that improves medical care but also increases medical spending. 
In principle the data cover 30 countries over 6 periods, leading to potentially 180 
observations. A considerable amount of observations are however missing, in particular 
from former Communist countries prior to 1990. The base-line model is estimated using 
109 observations. This leads to an (unavoidable) loss in efficiency of the estimators. 
There is no reason to assume that the missing observations are correlated with the 




The median age negatively affects the level of individual benefits and this effect is 
significant; the associated t-statistic equals -3.36. The R² equals 0.81; while this is high, 
not too much can be inferred from it. There is no statistical theory underlying R² and it 
increases when-ever more variables are included, irrespective of their relevance. The 
regression shows no evidence for the claim of median voter models that an older 
median voter successfully presses for higher pension spending. In fact, it shows quite 
the opposite. 
The median age does not significantly affect spending as a share of GDP, as Table 
2 indicates. The estimated effect itself is positive and an increase of one year is 
associated with an increase of 0.13 percentage point of GDP. The R² equals 0.52, which 




   
VARIABLES Benefits / retiree 
Pension expenditure 
/GDP 
   
Median age -0.052*** 0.134 
 (0.015) (0.113) 
Unemployment 0.008 0.121** 
 (0.007) (0.049) 
GDP per capita 0.761*** -1.113 
 (0.182) (1.329) 
Union density 0.007*** 0.043** 
 (0.002) (0.017) 
Government ideology -0.007 -0.038 
 (0.009) (0.069) 
Minority government -0.092** -0.663** 
 (0.040) (0.294) 
Single government  0.036 0.238 
 (0.042) (0.304) 
Interest rate 0.004 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.057) 
Year 1985 0.166*** 0.356 
 (0.053) (0.385) 
Year 1990 0.254*** 0.777 
 (0.073) (0.531) 
Year 1995 0.373*** 1.061 
 (0.103) (0.754) 
Year 2000 0.500*** 1.548 
 (0.129) (0.941) 
Year 2005 0.592*** 1.767 
 (0.154) (1.127) 
Constant 2.806 9.640 
 (1.905) (13.92) 
   
Observations 109 109 
R-squared 0.519 0.519 
Number of countries 21 21 
 Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The effect of other covariates varies. Union density is positively and significantly 
associated with both generosity of pensions and pension expenditure relative to GDP. 
This indicates that strong unions can bargain for higher pensions for employees. The 
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effect is quite substantial; the difference between no unions (that is, a membership of 
0%) and full unionization (100%) is five percentage points of GDP worth of pension 
expenditure. 
Unemployment affects expenditure relative to GDP positively and significantly. It 
has to be noted that unemployment is potentially endogenous; this potential problem is 
addressed below by taking the lagged value of unemployment. A minority government 
spends less on pensions as a share of GDP whereas GDP per capita positively influences 
the size of individual benefits. For the latter the effect of GDP per capita (0.76) is 
interesting; this indicates that if total production per inhabitant increases with 1%, 
benefits of retirees increases with 0.76%. Both regressions show a positive time trend in 
retirement spending -indicated by the coefficients of the time-dummies- though this is 
only significant for the regression with benefits per retiree as the dependent variable. 
Table 3 provides regressions with health care costs as the dependent variable. 
The effect of the median age on health care costs relative to GDP is positive yet 
insignificant. The same holds for health care costs per inhabitant. Taking the 




Table 3.  






      
Median age 0.006 0.054   
 (0.014) (0.076)   
Dependency ratio   -0.001 0.003 
   (0.005) (0.030) 
Unemployment -0.016*** -0.093*** -0.016*** -0.095*** 
 (0.006) (0.033) (0.006) (0.033) 
GDP per capita 0.381** -3.353*** 0.374** -3.346*** 
 (0.160) (0.892) (0.167) (0.933) 
Union density -0.005** -0.024** -0.005** -0.024** 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.011) 
Government ideology -0.004 -0.020 -0.004 -0.021 
 (0.008) (0.047) (0.008) (0.047) 
Minority government -0.071** -0.408** -0.073** -0.408** 
 (0.035) (0.197) (0.036) (0.203) 
Single government  0.014 0.011 0.011 -0.006 
 (0.037) (0.204) (0.037) (0.204) 
Interest rate 0.018** 0.090** 0.018** 0.090** 
 (0.007) (0.038) (0.007) (0.038) 
Year 1985 0.107** 0.513* 0.115*** 0.591** 
 (0.046) (0.258) (0.042) (0.235) 
Year 1990 0.197*** 0.976*** 0.214*** 1.117*** 
 (0.064) (0.356) (0.054) (0.304) 
Year 1995 0.363*** 1.817*** 0.387*** 2.022*** 
 (0.091) (0.506) (0.076) (0.423) 
Year 2000 0.447*** 2.184*** 0.480*** 2.454*** 
 (0.113) (0.631) (0.093) (0.522) 
Year 2005 0.641*** 3.269*** 0.683*** 3.605*** 
 (0.136) (0.756) (0.110) (0.613) 
Constant 3.000* 36.910*** 3.273* 38.580*** 
 (1.677) (9.342) (1.704) (9.516) 
     
Observations 109 109 109 109 
R-squared 0.918 0.622 0.918 0.620 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 
 Standard errors in parentheses  







V. Alternative specifications and robustness checks 
 
The models estimated so far rest on several assumptions and operationalizations for 
which there are sensible and defensible alternatives. Therefore this section considers 
several alternatives for the baseline model to assess whether the results are robust with 
respect to changes in the model set-up. The results are given in Table 4. 
The median age of the population increases over time and thus correlates with 
the time effects. The resulting multicollinearity increases standard errors and may 
obscure a significant effect. When the baseline regression is estimated without time 
dummies, the positive effect of median age on pension expenditure is indeed significant 
while the negative effect on benefits per retiree becomes insignificant. The positive 
relation between aging and pension expenditure relative to GDP indicates that 
multicollinearity may have been present. As long as time effects are deemed relevant 
for explaining government spending they cannot be omitted in the baseline regression, 
however; omitting relevant variables leads to biased estimators. 
Thus far the median age of the population has been used as the 
operationalization of aging. The median age is indeed the key factor in the political-
economic literature. There are however other notions of aging in the broader pension 
literature, in particular the dependency ratio. This ratio gives the number of people 
older than 64 year for each 100 persons of working age (15-64 year). This figure is 
prominent in many discussions as it gives the proportion between the elderly and the 
working people "supporting" them. The conclusions for this alternative 
operationalization of aging indeed differ substantially, as Table 4 indicates. Now the 
demographic variable -here the dependency ratio- has a positive and significant effect 
on expenditure and an insignificant effect on generosity of benefits. This underlines that 
the median age and the dependency ratios are different entities. The latter is a better 
measure for the relative number of retirees, which explains why it is positively 
associated with pension expenditure. When more people are eligible for pension 
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benefits, total spending will automatically increase. In median voter models, the median 
age is the crucial political variable, as that captures the theorized political clout of 
elderly. To disentangle the two effects, both variables are also jointly used as regressors. 
In this regression both variables have positive coefficients in both regressions, but only 
the effect of the dependency ratio on total pension expenditure (relative to GDP) is 
significant. 
Policy changes may need some time to respond to the political influence 
exercised by the median voter. First a government is elected and installed and 
thereafter it usually takes a considerable time to design, implement and actually 
execute a reform. For that reason a lagged value of the median voter is considered. As 
can be seen, the sign of the estimated effects remains the same but now the effects in 
both regressions are insignificant. One explanation is that using lagged values diminishes 
the number of observations; lagged values of the variables are not available for 1980. 
The number of observations decreases to 92, which may be too low to estimate 
fourteen parameters. 
The baseline regression is estimated with 109 observations. When fewer 
regressors are used, more observations can be considered however. When the omitted 
variables are relevant (as we expect) this generally leads to biased estimates. Such 
biased estimations can be useful nonetheless as their standard errors are smaller due to 
the increased number of observations. Regressions with 155 observations but fewer 
covariates again lead to similar conclusions as the baseline regressions. 
The base-line regressions are also re-estimated using lagged values of 
unemployment instead of contemporaneous values of unemployment. This specification 
addresses the possible endogeneity of unemployment. Unemployment may not only 
affect pension expenditure but may itself also be influenced by it. Higher spending on 
pensions may lead to either higher employment (as spending boosts aggregate demand) 


















        
Median age 0.258*** -0.013   0.217* 0.022 
 (0.082) (0.012)   (0.117) (0.017) 
Unemployment 0.151*** 0.021*** 0.108** 0.010 0.061 0.0022 
 (0.036) (0.005) (0.043) (0.007) (0.073) (0.011) 
GDP per capita 0.152 1.174*** 0.568 0.737*** -0.697 0.834*** 
 (1.037) (0.153) (1.206) (0.203) (1.385) (0.200) 
Union density 0.039** 0.005** 0.036** 0.007*** -0.014 -0.002 
 (0.016) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) 
Government ideology -0.026 -0.003 -0.060 -0.006 0.284** 0.042** 
 (0.067) (0.010) (0.061) (0.010) (0.130) (0.019) 
Minority government -0.672** -0.103** -0.372 -0.095** -0.365 -0.058 
 (0.284) (0.0418) (0.263) (0.044) (0.467) (0.067) 
Single government  0.314 0.059 0.295 0.051 -0.887** -0.116** 
 (0.293) (0.043) (0.263) (0.044) (0.400) (0.058) 
Interest rate -0.018 -0.005 0.013 0.004 0.072 0.015 
 (0.047) (0.007) (0.050) (0.008) (0.104) (0.015) 
Median age (lagged)       
       
Dependency ratio   0.200*** -0.005 0.306*** 0.015 
   (0.039) (0.007) (0.075) (0.011) 
Unemployment (lagged)       
       
Year 1985   0.461 0.092* 0.040 0.022 
   (0.304) (0.051) (0.702) (0.101) 
Year 1990   0.573 0.126* -0.209 -0.032 
   (0.393) (0.066) (0.756) (0.109) 
Year 1995   0.860 0.186** -0.135 -0.005 
   (0.548) (0.092) (0.932) (0.135) 
Year 2000   1.075 0.256** -0.389 -0.041 
   (0.674) (0.113) (1.057) (0.153) 
Year 2005   1.158 0.287** -0.305 -0.024 
   (0.793) (0.133) (1.193) (0.172) 
Constant -6.429 -2.371* -6.689 1.437 -1.858 -0.378 
 (9.453) (1.392) (12.310) (2.067) (14.020) (2.023) 
       
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 
R-squared 0.499 0.765 0.635 0.778 0.527 0.512 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. (continued) 
 













       
Median age   0.217** -0.011 0.115 -0.051*** 
   (0.105) (0.019) (0.113) (0.015) 
Unemployment 0.096* 0.013 0.148*** 0.0170**   
 (0.057) (0.008) (0.041) (0.007)   
GDP per capita -0.865 0.855*** -0.630 1.067*** -2.910** 0.608*** 
 (1.665) (0.242) (1.042) (0.186) (1.129) (0.149) 
Union density 0.042* 0.004   0.053*** 0.007*** 
 (0.024) (0.004)   (0.017) (0.002) 
Government ideology -0.047 0.005   -0.027 -0.005 
 (0.080) (0.012)   (0.069) (0.009) 
Minority government -0.498 -0.095*   -0.577* -0.087** 
 (0.329) (0.048)   (0.297) (0.039) 
Single government  -0.034 0.037   0.088 0.030 
 (0.375) (0.055)   (0.307) (0.041) 
Interest rate 0.0138 0.005   0.0134 0.001 
 (0.074) (0.011)   (0.059) (0.008) 
Median age (lagged) 0.017 -0.004     
 (0.026) (0.004)     
Dependency ratio       
       
Unemployment (lagged)     0.022 -0.005 
     (0.039) (0.005) 
Year 1985   -0.006 0.045 0.729** 0.214*** 
   (0.348) (0.062) (0.352) (0.046) 
Year 1990 0.517* 0.014 0.459 0.078 1.222** 0.321*** 
 (0.304) (0.044) (0.454) (0.081) (0.512) (0.068) 
Year 1995 1.027** 0.0516 0.459 0.103 1.983*** 0.459*** 
 (0.493) (0.072) (0.605) (0.108) (0.608) (0.080) 
Year 2000 1.500** 0.105 0.557 0.095 2.410*** 0.596*** 
 (0.686) (0.010) (0.783) (0.140) (0.841) (0.111) 
Year 2005 1.845** 0.132 0.555 0.115 2.889*** 0.682*** 
 (0.851) (0.124) (0.957) (0.171) (0.972) (0.128) 
Constant 11.830 0.473 3.579 -1.318 28.100** 4.335*** 
 (16.880) (2.457) (10.630) (1.901) (11.830) (1.562) 
       
Observations 92 92 155 155 112 112 
R-squared 0.423 0.706 0.441 0.702 0.483 0.812 
Number of countries 21 21 30 30 21 21 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 21 
V. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper has tested the hypothesis that an older median voter leads to more generous 
pensions. The overall conclusion is that an increase in the age of the median voter does 
not lead to more generous pensions. If anything, it leads to lower pensions. Considering 
health care spending instead of pension expenditure leads to similar conclusions. So the 
main prediction of median voter models, that a greying median voter will successfully 
push for higher benefits, is not supported.  
It is even questionable whether an older median voter leads to more pension 
expenditure relative to GDP. In the baseline model, this is not the case. There is 
however a positive, significant effect when time effects are omitted or when the 
dependency ratio is considered as an alternative proxy for aging. The latter is in line with 
expectations, as more people are entitled to pension benefits. It is also in line with 
preferences of a majority of West-European voters, Boeri et al. (2002).  
The results challenge the prominent role attributed in the theoretical literature 
to the median voter in both explaining and predicting welfare state changes. Apparently 
the median voter model does not fully capture the political process determining pension 
benefits. Other factors, off-setting the increased potential political clout of retirees, are 
important. Two theoretical approaches that can explain rising total expenditure and 
decreasing generosity are probability voting and models with endogenous labor supply. 
The empirical results here indicate that unions have a significant effect on political 
outcomes. Integrating these theoretical insights and empirical outcomes, is warranted 
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